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It is widely believed that countries with greater levels of income inequality also have lower levels of intergenerational mobility. This relationship, known as the Great Gatsby Curve (GGC), has been prominently cited by high-ranking public policymak-
ers, bestselling authors, and Nobel Prize–winning academics. Yet, relatively little cross-
national work has empirically examined the mechanisms thought to underpin the 
GGC—particularly with regard to the role of educational attainment. This paper uses 
the cross-nationally comparable Programme for International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC) data set to shed new light on this issue. We find that income 
inequality is associated with several key components of the intergenerational transmis-
sion process—including access to higher education, the financial returns on education, 
and the residual effect of parental education upon labor-market earnings. Thus, con-
sistent with theoretical models, we find that educational attainment is an important 
driver of the relationship between intergenerational mobility and income inequality. We 
hence conclude that unequal access to financial resources plays a central role in the 
intergenerational transmission of advantage.
Introduction
Income inequality is high and rising in a number of developed countries (OECD 
2012). There is widespread concern that this may lead to lower levels of intergen-
erational mobility. For instance, Ermisch, Jäntti, and Smeeding (2012, 3) stated that:
Of all the potential consequences of rising economic inequality, none is 
more worrisome than the possibility that rising inequality will have the 
long-term effect of reducing equality of opportunity and intergenera-
tional mobility.
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This statement was supported by Duncan and Murnane (2011, 20):
Only if our country [the United States] faces the consequences of growing 
income inequality will it be able to maintain its rich heritage of upward 
social mobility.
A key reason why many believe income inequality and intergenerational mobility 
are linked is that this can be observed cross-nationally; economically unequal 
countries are the least socially mobile. This is often demonstrated via a graph that 
plots the Gini coefficient (income inequality) against the intergenerational income 
elasticity (a measure of social mobility). An upward-sloping line, then, demon-
strates what has become known as the “Great Gatsby Curve (GGC)”; greater 
income inequality is associated with less social mobility.
This finding has been subject to much attention. It has been cited by Nobel 
Prize–winning economists (Heckman 2013), high-ranking policymakers (White 
House 2013; Obama 2013), bestselling authors (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), 
and the popular science press (Economist 2013). Indeed, Professor Alan Krueger 
(2012) even used the curve to predict that, due to recent increases in income 
inequality, income mobility will further decline in the United States over the next 
25 years.
Yet, despite widespread interest in the GGC, relatively little work has exam-
ined the mechanisms thought to underpin it. This includes the role of educational 
attainment, a factor many sociologists and economists deem critical in the trans-
mission of (dis)advantage across generations (Duncan and Hodge 1963; Blau and 
Duncan 1967; Becker and Tomes 1986; Hout 1988; Ishida, Müller, and Ridge 
1995; Breen and Goldthorpe 2001; Breen and Jonsson 2007; Duncan and 
 Murnane 2011). Although recognition of the importance of education dates back to 
Blau and Duncan (Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan and Hodge 1963), few empiri-
cally examined the role of education in social mobility until the 1990s (Ganzeboom, 
Treiman, and Ultee 1991; Breen and Jonsson 2005). Since then, numerous studies 
have considered how education mediates the link between social origin and des-
tination, including how this compares across national settings (see Breen and 
Jonsson [2005] for a review). However, there is little evidence as to how this is 
then linked to income inequality. This paper fills this gap by examining cross-
national variation in the relationship between parental education, educational 
attainment of offspring, and labor-market outcomes, and whether stronger asso-
ciations are found in societies with more income inequality. We address the fol-
lowing research questions.
First, we ask whether there is indeed a strong link between income inequality and 
intergenerational mobility. As noted by Saunders (2012), Jäntti and Jenkins (2013), 
and Blanden (2013), different methods have been used across countries to produce 
the income mobility estimates usually plotted on the GGC, with substantial differ-
ences across countries in terms of data quality. Indeed, two experts recently empha-
sized how, despite the prominence of the GGC, relatively little is actually known 
about the link between income inequality and intergenerational mobility (Jäntti and 
Jenkins 2013, 188). They have therefore highlighted the need for further work in 
this area—particularly greater use of cross-nationally comparable data.
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Our first aim is to provide new evidence closely related to what the aforemen-
tioned academics are calling for. Specifically, the cross-nationally comparable 
Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) data 
set is used to investigate the link between comparable measures of parental edu-
cation and offspring’s earnings. We thus investigate whether the GGC can be 
replicated using an alternative definition of intergenerational mobility and data 
designed to facilitate such international comparisons.
Research Question 1. How does the link between parental education and off-
spring’s earnings vary across countries? Is  this association stronger in more 
unequal countries?
Our second contribution is to consider the role of offspring’s educational 
attainment in forming our version of the GGC. Despite the prominence of 
education in theoretical models of intergenerational persistence (Blau and 
Duncan 1967; Sewell and Ohlendorf 1970; Boudon 1974; Breen 2004), rela-
tively little empirical work has examined whether this may be driving the 
link between income inequality and mobility. (Gregg et al. [2013] is an 
exception, who investigate the role of education in explaining income mobility 
across Sweden, the UK, and the United States. They find that Sweden has the 
most income mobility, due to smaller “residual” effects of parental income on 
offspring’s earnings, and lower returns to education). We further the research 
of Gregg et al. (2013) by investigating whether educational attainment medi-
ates the intergenerational transmission process, how this varies across sev-
eral countries, and whether this is independently associated with income 
inequality.
Research Question 2. Does educational attainment mediate the relationship 
between parental education and offspring’s earnings? Is this “through education” 
effect stronger in more unequal countries? Is there also an association between 
income inequality and “residual” family background effects?
Finally, our decomposition shows that the mediating effect of education operates 
through two channels:
(i) The socio-economic gradient in offspring’s educational attainment (“access 
to education”); and
(ii) The labor-market value of qualifications (“returns to education”).
Both are likely to vary across countries. For instance, returns to education will 
depend upon the structure of a country’s economy (e.g., the main industries and 
whether they require an educated workforce) and the supply and demand for 
skills. Likewise, returns will also be influenced by structural factors, such as 
young people’s willingness to migrate to find employment (i.e., whether they can 
“match” their skills to an appropriate job) and the strength of labor unions. 
However, we argue that both channel (i) and (ii) will also be stronger in more 
unequal countries (Solon 2004; Breen and Jonsson 2005; Mayer 2010). Our final 
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aim is to bring data to bear on these issues by investigating whether (a) income 
inequality is linked to differences in university completion rates by parental 
 education group; (b) the returns to education are indeed higher in more unequal 
countries; and (c) if either stands out as a particularly important driver of our 
version of the GGC.
Research Question 3. Is the relationship between parental education and access 
to higher education stronger in more unequal countries? Are the economic 
returns to education greater in more unequal countries?
Note that our objective is to establish whether strong associations between 
income inequality and intergenerational opportunities exist at the cross-coun-
try level, and the extent to which educational attainment is an important 
mediating factor. Although establishing causality is clearly an important 
 long-term goal, it is beyond the scope of this paper and the data currently 
available.
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Methodology
Becker and Tomes (1986), Breen and Jonsson (2005), Corak (2013), Duncan and 
Murnane (2011), and Solon (2004) argue that in societies with greater inequality, 
there are larger disparities in the resources invested in children between rich and 
poor. This begins in utero (e.g., quality of prenatal care), and continues throughout 
early childhood via educational inputs (including parental time). Consequently, 
large socio-economic differences in cognitive functioning emerge before compul-
sory schooling has begun (Becker 2011; Cunha et al. 2006). Income inequality 
then leads to greater school and neighborhood segregation (Harding et al. 2011), 
with disadvantaged children attending lower-quality schools than their more afflu-
ent peers (Garner and Raudenbush 1991; Mayer 2002). This, along with continu-
ing disparities in educational investments, reinforces the skill gap between 
socio-economic groups. Thus, by the end of secondary school, there will be sub-
stantial differences in academic abilities (Marks 2014), future aspirations (Sikora 
and Saha 2007), and a range of other social (“noncognitive”) skills (Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996).
This will influence whether children obtain a bachelor’s degree (Jackson et al. 
2007). Income inequality may also directly influence college access if low-income 
families cannot afford tertiary education (Jackson and Jonsson 2013) or the 
increasingly necessary extracurricular experiences (Lehmann 2012). Yet, college 
graduates earn substantially more than other groups (Hout 2012)—with these 
returns greater in more unequal labor markets. Moreover, family resources con-
tinue to matter, as the wealthy support their offspring during their job search (Lin 
1999). Successful labor-market transitions are therefore harder for those from 
poor backgrounds, even conditional on educational attainment (Goldthorpe 
2013)—particularly when labor markets are very unequal. The Great Gatsby 
Curve  presents “a summary of all these underlying gradients, reflecting the 
 outcome of a whole host of ways that inequality of incomes affects children” 
(Corak 2013, 7).
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This argument is formalized in figure 1, which links parental education to 
offspring’s earnings. The raw association between parental education and 
 offspring earnings is the measure of intergenerational mobility used in this paper, 
henceforth labeled βK (where K equals country). We estimate βK across 24 coun-
tries using the following OLS regression model:1
 
Log Y E CijChild ij
parent
ij ij( ) . . ,= + + + ∇α β φ ε K  (1)
whereYijChild  = Offspring earnings, Eij
parent  = Highest level of parental education, 
C = A vector of control variables (quadratic age, immigrant status), ε = Error 
term, i = Individual i, j = Cluster j (referring to the sample design, with respon-
dents clustered within geographic units), and ∇ K = Refers to the same model 
being estimated separately in each country (K).
Parental education is the measure of social stratification used in our estima-
tions of intergenerational mobility. This is in contrast to previous work on the 
GGC, where parental income has been preferred. We depart from this convention 
for both theoretical and data reasons. Regarding the latter, there is no cross-
nationally comparable data set containing high-quality information on parental 
income across a large number of countries. This includes PIAAC, with parental 
education being the best available proxy. However, we argue that parental educa-
tion may be preferable anyway, as it is likely to capture a broader array of paren-
tal inputs into children’s development (Leibowitz 1977).2 For instance, educated 
parents not only earn more (“financial resources”), but also have greater social 
and cultural capital (“nonfinancial resources”); see Bukodi and Goldthorpe 
(2012). Figure 1 illustrates how both influence children’s educational attainment 
and labor-market outcomes, and that measures of social stratification should 
incorporate both. We maintain that parental education probably performs this 
function better than parental income.3
Figure 1 illustrates that the link between parental education and offspring’s 
earnings can be separated into two components: the part working through off-
spring’s educational attainment (dashed arrows) and the part that is not (solid 
gray arrows). (One may view this as an extension of the Origin – Education – 
Destination (OED) triangle that has a long tradition in social stratification 
research. See Breen [2004] and Goldthorpe [2013].) Formally, following Gregg 
et al. (2013), the intergenerational association (β) will be divided into the follow-
ing parts:
 β γ λ δ= +.  (2)
where β = Total association between parental education and offspring’s earnings; 
γ = Labor-market value of qualifications; λ = Relationship between parent and 
offspring’s educational attainment; and δ = The (unexplained) residual influence 
of parental education on offspring’s earnings.
γ.λ represents the “through education” effect of parental education upon off-
spring’s earnings; it is the part that can be accounted for by differences in educa-
tional attainment across offspring. The second component, the intergenerational 
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correlation of education (λ), is itself determined by two factors (see Becker 
[1964]):
(i) Parental capacity to invest in their offspring’s education. (This will be influ-
enced by the dispersion of financial and nonfinancial resources in the country 
in which the parents live.)
(ii) Parental incentives to invest in their offspring’s education. (This will be influ-
enced by the parents’ perception of the future returns to education, γ, when 
their offspring are adults.)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate the separate effects of (i) and (ii) in 
our analysis, as both are likely to be influenced by income inequality at the same 
point in time.4 However, to provide indicative evidence on this matter, we will 
discuss results from additional analysis investigating the link between family 
background and subject choice. (We argue that, while families’ capacity to invest 
is unlikely to differ by subject, their incentives may due to large differences in 
economic returns.)
In contrast, δ is the unexplained (residual) effect; it is the association between 
parental education and offspring’s earnings that remains after controlling educa-
tional attainment. We estimate the magnitude of each component across coun-
tries, and examine whether they are larger in more unequal societies. These 
components are further discussed below.
The Intergenerational Correlation of Education (λ)
λ represents the intergenerational correlation of education; the association 
between the educational attainment of parents (Eij
parent ) and offspring (Eijchild ). We 
investigate how λ varies across countries, and whether it is linked to income 
inequality (this hypothesised correlation with income inequality is denoted ρλ).
Figure 1 illustrates that three factors drive λ:
 Heredity (H) = The genetic transfer of skills across generations
 Nonfinancial resources (NF) = Nonfinancial inputs into children’s develop-
ment (e.g., reading stories, helping with homework).
 Financial resources (F) = Monetary inputs into children’s development (e.g., 
private tuition, school quality, tuition fees).
If λ does vary across countries, this is unlikely to be due to channel H; heredity 
transfers will not lead to stronger intergenerational associations in Britain than 
Australia (for example). Conversely, the distribution of NF resources may vary 
across countries; cultural and scholarly capital could be more evenly spread 
among the population in Sweden than the United States (for example). Although 
this would lead to cross-national variation in λ, it is not then clear why λ would be 
strongly associated with income inequality (though one cannot rule this possibility 
out).5 Consequently, if an association between λ and income inequality does exist 
(i.e., ρλ > 0), then it is likely to work mainly through channel F (where a strong 
plausible mechanism is clear). Specifically, greater income inequality leads to 
greater disparity in financial resources between high and low parental education 
groups, which generates bigger differences in offspring’s educational attainment.
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Appendix C presents empirical evidence on this matter by exploring the rela-
tionship between income inequality and family background differences in finan-
cial and nonfinancial investments using the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA). The cross-national correlation between income inequality and 
financial investments is strong (Spearman’s rank = 0.73), while for nonfinancial 
investments it is relatively weak (Spearman’s rank = 0.20). This is consistent with 
channel F driving any association between income inequality and the intergen-
erational correlation of education.
λ is estimated using the following OLS regression model, before being plotted 
against income inequality:
 
Ed E Cijchild ij
parent
ij ij= + + + ∇α λ φ ε. . .K  (3)
The stronger the association (ρλ), the greater the evidence that access to finan-
cial resources (and, to a lesser extent, nonfinancial resources) matters in the inter-
generational transmission of advantage.
The Returns on Education (γ)
There is likely to be a strong association between parent and offspring education 
(λ) due to financial, nonfinancial, and heredity factors. The impact upon off-
spring’s earnings will depend, however, upon the value of qualifications in the 
labor market; that is, returns on education (γ). The product of λ* γ hence deter-
mines the impact of offspring’s education on intergenerational persistence (β). 
For instance, there may be strong parent-child education links within a country, 
but this may have little impact upon β if economic rewards to schooling are low.
Figure 1 illustrates our hypothesis that γ will be greater in more unequal coun-
tries. (We denote this correlation as ργ) This is because financial rewards to more 
schooling are likely to be greater in societies where the income distribution is 
more dispersed. For example, university graduates will earn more, on average, 
than high school graduates in every country. But, with more inequality in the 
earnings distribution, the wage differential between graduates and non-graduates 
will be considerably larger. Similarly, wages are likely to be taxed and redistrib-
uted more in low-income-inequality countries, further reducing the private 
returns on education (relative to high-income-inequality countries).
Consequently, income inequality will have a double influence upon the “through 
education” component of the intergenerational transmission process; it will affect 
both the intergenerational correlation of education (λ) and the economic rewards 
of holding higher qualifications (γ). Becker (1964) suggests that this creates the 
perfect storm—more advantaged families have greater resources to invest in their 
children’s education and greater incentives to do so in more unequal countries. 
This then leads to a pronounced relationship between income inequality and the 
“through education” component of β. We test this hypothesis in our analysis.
γ is estimated via model (4), capturing the link between offspring’s education 
and their earnings, conditional upon parental education:
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Log Y E Ed CijChild ij
parent
ij
child
ij ij( ) . . . .= + + + + ∇α δ γ φ ε K  (4)
Moreover, by rearranging equation (2) one can see that the combined “through 
education” effect (γ.λ) is the difference between the unconditional (β
∧
) and condi-
tional (δ
∧
) parameter estimates given by (1) and (4):
 γ λ. ( ) .= − =β δ
∧ ∧
Through education effect  
(5)
In our empirical analysis, we investigate whether (γ.λ) is linked to income 
inequality, before considering each subcomponent in turn.
School Systems and Public versus Private Investment in Education
There are a number of other important factors, beyond family-specific invest-
ments and behaviors, that could vary across countries and be associated with 
income inequality. Examples include residential income segregation and public 
expenditure on education. We argue that parental financial resources will be par-
ticularly important where such factors are not well aligned to the interests of 
disadvantaged groups (i.e., where segregation is high and public expenditure on 
education is low).
Focusing on public expenditure on schooling, for financial resources to be 
important in the intergenerational transmission process, parents must be able to 
gain an advantage for their offspring from using them (Lucas 2001). This will 
depend upon the design of the education system, including public resources 
invested. For instance, if all countries provided universal, high-quality, free public 
education, then private investment would be crowded out. Consequently, access 
to financial resources (and therefore income inequality) would be unlikely to mat-
ter. In other words, public investment can potentially compensate for a lack of 
private investment by disadvantaged families (see figure 1). Yet, education sys-
tems differ markedly in this respect. In some, the proportion of national wealth 
spent upon public education is large, while in others the private sector has a more 
prominent role.
We hypothesize that in high-inequality countries, public investment in educa-
tion will be lower and private investments will be higher. In other words, there 
will be less scope for public education to “level the playing field” between the rich 
and poor. We test this by estimating the association between income inequality 
and the following factors:
•	 Expenditure on education as a percent of GDP
•	 Percent of pupils enrolled in private-independent schools
•	 Percent of pupils using a private out-of-school tutor
•	 Socio-economic differences in the probability of using a private out-of-school 
tutor
•	 Tertiary education tuition costs.
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Residual Effects
Parental education may influence offspring’s earnings in ways other than through 
educational attainment (solid gray arrows in figure 1). This is the “residual” effect 
(δK), which operates via three mechanisms. The first is financial resources. For 
instance, unpaid internships are becoming an important intermediate step 
between college and the labor market. High parental education families can use 
their greater financial resources to support their offspring during this transition, 
while low parental education families may not. Similarly, offspring from families 
with greater financial resources may have more time to find a suitable job than 
offspring from families with fewer resources. This will be a bigger problem in 
countries with greater differences in financial resources between parental educa-
tion groups (i.e., those with more income inequality).
The second mechanism is through the use of social and cultural resources 
(Bourdieu 1986), including connections and networks in the labor market—that 
is, nonfinancial resources. For instance, highly educated parents may draw upon 
their networks to secure their offspring a well-paid job (Coleman 1990). Low-
educated parents may be unable to provide their offspring with the same labor-
market opportunities (even when their offspring hold the same qualifications). 
Moreover, although reasons why this would vary by income inequality are not as 
apparent as for the financial resources (F) channel, one cannot rule this possibility 
out (e.g., an anonymous referee has suggested residential segregation as one such 
possibility).
The final mechanism is heredity endowments. An example is looks or beauty. 
Such traits are passed across generations, do not operate through educational 
attainment, and have nontrivial labor-market rewards (see Hamermesh and Biddle 
[2001]). They will thus be incorporated in δK. Other examples might include 
personality, eloquence, the ability to read emotions, and other noncognitive skills 
that do not influence offspring’s educational attainment (Jackson 2006). How-
ever, as with heredity transmission of skills, this process is unlikely to differ across 
countries (or be associated with income inequality).
We therefore argue that if there is a systematic association between δK and 
income inequality, this will largely be driven by channel F (access to financial 
resources). This would, in turn, suggest that access to financial resources is central 
to the intergenerational transmission process. Estimates of δK are drawn from 
equation (4). We examine whether these δK are greater in more unequal countries.
Data
Survey Design
PIAAC was conducted in 2011, and provides internationally comparable infor-
mation on educational attainment and labor-market outcomes. Geographic 
regions were selected as the primary sampling units, with one 16-to-65-year-old 
within each household randomly chosen to participate (OECD 2013, chapter 14). 
Response rates ranged from 45 percent in Sweden to 75 percent in Korea (median 
equals 62 percent). The survey organizers undertook a thorough analysis of non-
response (OECD 2013, chapter 16), finding that this problem was typically 
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 “minimal” to “low” (see appendix table A1). To account for the complex survey 
design, response and replicate weights are applied throughout.
We restrict the sample to men aged between 25 and 59. Female respondents are 
excluded to maximize comparability with the existing literature (which has 
focused upon men) and the added complexity of labor-market selection for 
women.6 Individuals younger than 25 and older than 59 have been excluded, as 
their earnings are subject to “transitory” fluctuations, leading to “life-cycle bias” 
(see Haider and Solon [2006]). Our analysis thus focuses upon men born between 
roughly 1950 and 1985, with estimates essentially an average for individuals born 
during this period. (We have reproduced all estimates for 35-to-55-year-old males 
only with little substantive change to results). Sample sizes range from 472 in 
 Russia to 7,707 in Canada (with a median of 1,453); see online appendix table A1.
Parental Education
Respondents were asked about their parents’ education. This is measured using Inter-
national Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels; a schema designed to 
facilitate cross-national comparisons. Following much of the cross-national literature 
(e.g., the Luxemburg Income Study7), a collapsed version of ISCED is used:
•	 Low = Neither parent obtained upper secondary schooling
•	 Middle = At least one parent attained secondary and postsecondary, nonter-
tiary education
•	 High = At least one parent attained tertiary education.
Estimates of intergenerational associations (β, λ, and δ) refer to differences 
between high and low parental education groups.
Our measure of parental education has limitations. For instance, its distribu-
tion differs across countries (see appendix table A2). We therefore perform vari-
ous robustness tests, operationalizing parental education in different ways. 
Specifically, within each country, information on mother’s education, father’s 
education, and number of books at home (a common proxy for parental schol-
arly capital in cross-national research) is combined to create a continuous paren-
tal education index. This index has been standardized to mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1 within each country, and has the advantage of (i) combining informa-
tion from an array of variables; (ii) having the same distribution within each 
country; and (iii) including information from throughout the parental education 
distribution. All results are reproduced using this alternative metric in online 
appendix D and E, while appendix F presents results where father’s education 
only is used. There is little substantive change to the conclusions reached.
Earnings
Respondents’ gross (pretax) labor-market earnings were collected via a battery of 
questions, designed to maximize the quality of reports while minimizing nonre-
sponse. Earnings could be reported hourly, daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, 
annually, or at a piece rate, with categories used where respondents were  unwilling 
to provide exact amounts. Separate questions were asked about bonuses, and to 
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the self-employed. A gross (pretax) monthly earnings variable has then been 
derived by the OECD (OECD 2013, chapter 20.4), as follows:
(i) All information converted into a consistent reporting period (e.g., from 
hourly to yearly)
(ii) Categorical earnings converted into direct amounts
(iii) A Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) correction applied.
The natural logarithm of PPP-adjusted labor-market earnings is used, for all indi-
viduals either employed or self-employed. (The unemployed and labor-market 
inactive, whose earnings are unobserved, are excluded.)
Offspring’s Educational Attainment
Detailed questions were asked about qualifications held. Country-specific options 
were provided, and converted into ISCED levels by the OECD. Measures of edu-
cational transitions are preferred to linear models of years of education due to 
changes in the marginal distribution of education, and the notion that educa-
tional attainment reflects a series of decisions (Breen and Jonsson 2005). The 
following categories are formed:
(a) Primary (ISCED level 1)
(b) Lower secondary (ISCED level 2 or 3c short)
(c) Upper secondary (ISCED level 3a, 3b, and 3c long)
(d) Postsecondary, nontertiary (ISCED level 4)
(e) Professional degree (ISCED level 5b)
(f) Bachelor’s degree (ISCED 5a)
(g) Master’s/research degree (ISCED 5a/6).
When decomposing the link between parental education and offspring’s earn-
ings into explained and residual components (recall equation 4), this seven-cate-
gory schema is used. In contrast, categories are collapsed when estimating access 
to (λ) and returns from (γ) education, as follows:
(i) Upper secondary school and below (categories a to c above)
(ii) Postsecondary but below bachelor’s degree (categories d to e above)
(iii) Bachelor’s degree and above (categories f and g above).
(The distribution of this variable across countries is presented in appendix table 
A3.) This is to facilitate the production and presentation of results across a large 
number of countries. We consider the implications from using the seven-category 
versus three-category measure in appendix G.
Subject specialization may also play a role in the “through education” compo-
nent of intergenerational mobility, as graduates majoring in certain disciplines 
earn higher wages (Black, Sanders, and Taylor 2003). If subject choice is also 
related to family background (e.g., by certain university disciplines requiring 
higher school grades), then this will be an important “through education” mech-
anism. Subject of highest qualification, using a nine-category grouping, is there-
fore also controlled (as part of Edijchild ).
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Years of Education
A limitation of the offspring’s educational attainment measure is that its distribution 
varies across countries (see appendix table A3). We therefore also measure the inter-
generational correlation of education (λ) and returns (γ) using respondents’ years of 
schooling. Specifically, respondents’ education has been converted into a “years of 
schooling” equivalent using OECD (2005, 422),8 and then standardized to mean 0 
and standard deviation 1 within each country. There are two advantages of this 
approach. First, as years of schooling has been standardized, the spread is the same 
within each country. (All results therefore refer to differences in national standard 
deviations.) Second, as years of schooling is continuous, information is captured 
from throughout the educational achievement distribution (rather than just the 
extremes). This is therefore a useful alternative to test the robustness of our results.
Income Inequality
Income inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient. Although there are alter-
natives (e.g., Atkinson coefficient, decile ratios), similar GGC estimates are 
obtained regardless of the income inequality measure used (Blanden 2013). This 
information is drawn from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS),9 widely consid-
ered to be the “gold standard” in income inequality measurement across coun-
tries (Atkinson 2004) due to the consistency of population coverage, income 
concept (disposable household income), unit of analysis, and equivalence scales. 
However, for most countries, data are available only from around 1980 onward.
This leads to an important question: At what point should income inequality 
be measured? In theory, inequality during childhood should be particularly 
important for the part of mobility working through the intergenerational correla-
tion of education. In contrast, present-day inequality should be a more important 
predictor of the returns to education. Consequently, inequality throughout the 
life course should influence the intergenerational transmission of advantage. With 
this in mind, our primary measure of income inequality is the average Gini coef-
ficient across all available LIS waves.
Alternative information on income inequality is available from the Standard-
ized World Income Inequality Dataset, SWIID.10 This contains income inequality 
data for more countries than the LIS, and over a longer time period (1960 to 
2010 for most of the OECD). However, it also has lower levels of cross-national 
comparability (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001), particularly for years prior to 
1980.
Nevertheless, we use this alternative data set to test the robustness of our 
results. First, we average the Gini coefficient across all available years between 
1965 and 2010, and find little change to the conclusions reached. Second, mea-
sures of “childhood” inequality (average Gini coefficient between 1965 and 1985) 
and present-day inequality (average Gini coefficient between 2005 and 2011) are 
created, and correlated with β, γ, λ, and δ. Moderate to strong associations are 
typically found for each of the above, regardless of the income inequality measure 
used. However, although we find support for the hypothesis that the returns on 
education are more strongly associated with present-day inequality than  childhood 
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inequality (r = 0.59 versus r = 0.39), the opposite does not seem to hold true for 
the intergenerational correlation of education (r = 0.55 versus r = 0.64).11
Country Selection
Twenty-two OECD and two non-OECD (Russia and Cyprus) countries partici-
pated in PIAAC. However, as Andrews and Leigh (2009) argue, “it may be unrea-
sonable to draw a link between [income] inequality … and intergenerational 
mobility” for “transition” economies previously under Communist rule. In par-
ticular, recall that the sample includes men born between 1950 and 1985, when 
these countries did not have a market economy. Individuals in these countries 
would have also experienced substantial economic, social, and political change, 
with such instability potentially leading to unusual and unpredictable patterns of 
social mobility. Consequently, it has been argued that these countries are unlikely 
to demonstrate the hypothesized link between income inequality and intergen-
erational mobility, and should therefore be excluded from the GGC (Andrews 
and Leigh 2009).
This complication will be handled as follows. The GGC will first be repro-
duced using parental education–offspring earnings estimates from 23 of the 24 
PIAAC countries (Cyprus is excluded due to a lack of income inequality data 
within the LIS). The sensitivity of our version of the GGC to the inclusion/exclu-
sion of the five transition economies (Russia, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, 
and the Slovak Republic) is then illustrated. Subsequent decompositions will be 
presented for all countries, with the transition economies only excluded from our 
graphical representations of how the different components of the intergenera-
tional association (γ, λ, and δ) vary with income inequality.
Results
Does the Great Gatsby Curve Really Exist?
Table 1 presents estimates of the link between parental education and labor-
market earnings (β). In all countries there is a strong and statistically significant 
association, with individuals from low parental education backgrounds earning 
up to 75 percent less than those from high parental education backgrounds. 
However, the strength of this association varies across countries. Finland, Swe-
den, Norway, and Denmark are all toward the bottom of table 1, where the 
parental education–offspring earnings gap is approximately 20 percent or less. 
On the other hand, the equivalent difference in the Slovak Republic and United 
States is more than 70 percent. Overall, the ranking of countries in table 1 is 
broadly similar to Blanden (2013, table 2) and Corak (2012), who perform a 
similar cross-country comparison using an alternative measure of social mobility 
(the link between the income of fathers and sons). Indeed, the correlation between 
our estimates in table 1 and Blanden (2013, table 2) is 0.73 (rank-order correla-
tion 0.75). Similarly, the correlation between our mobility estimates and those of 
Corak (2012) equals 0.79 (rank order 0.83).
Figure 2 plots these β coefficients against income inequality. (See online appen-
dix table A1 for the key to country abbreviations.) The left-hand panel includes 
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all countries. Although we find a link between income inequality and mobility, 
this association is relatively weak. The correlation coefficient equals 0.39 (Spear-
man’s rank 0.49)—notably less than the 0.85 reported by Krugman (2012) and 
the 0.60 by Blanden (2013). Similarly, the fitted regression line suggests that a 
0.10 increase in the Gini coefficient (roughly the difference in income inequality 
between Sweden and the UK) is associated with a relatively small (0.11) increase 
in β. Nevertheless, this association does reach statistical significance at conven-
tional thresholds.
However, as discussed above, the hypothesized link between income inequality 
and intergenerational mobility is unlikely to hold in the transitional economies of 
Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, and the Slovak Republic, where there 
was substantial social, economic, and political change during the late 20th 
Table 1. The Estimated Difference in Earnings between Individuals from “Low” and “High” 
Parental Education Backgrounds
β SE % difference [exp(β)]
USA 0.56 0.09 75
Slovak Republic 0.55 0.10 74
Poland 0.47 0.10 61
UK 0.42 0.07 51
Japan 0.37 0.06 44
Russia 0.35 0.23 42
France 0.33 0.04 40
South Korea 0.33 0.05 40
Ireland 0.33 0.07 39
Spain 0.30 0.13 35
Italy 0.28 0.18 33
Czech Republic 0.26 0.06 30
Australia 0.25 0.05 28
Estonia 0.25 0.06 28
Germany 0.24 0.08 27
Canada 0.22 0.04 25
Denmark 0.21 0.06 24
Austria 0.20 0.07 22
Finland 0.17 0.05 19
Sweden 0.14 0.04 15
Netherlands 0.14 0.04 15
Belgium 0.14 0.04 15
Norway 0.12 0.05 13
Note: Authors’ estimates using the PIAAC data set. Figures refer to the earnings differential 
between individuals from advantaged (high parental education) and disadvantaged (low 
parental education) backgrounds. SE refers to the standard error.
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 century. Moreover, these countries have a big impact upon the results presented 
in the left-hand panel of figure 2, and are thus excluded in the panel on the right. 
Consistent with Andrews and Leigh (2009), the association between income 
inequality and intergenerational mobility becomes significantly stronger. The cor-
relation coefficient increases to 0.86 (Spearman’s rank = 0.81), with a 0.10 
increase in the Gini now associated with a 0.26 increase in β. These magnitudes 
are consistent with Corak (2012) and Blanden (2013), neither of whom included 
transition economies in their versions of the GGC. Together, this provides strong 
evidence that income inequality is indeed linked to intergenerational mobility 
(at the cross-national level) when alternative and comparable measures of paren-
tal background are used.
To What Extent Does Educational Attainment Mediate the Link between 
Parental Education and Labor-Market Outcomes?
Table 2 decomposes β into the part that works through offspring’s educational 
attainment (γ.λ) and the residual component (δ). Educational attainment is an 
important mediating factor; in all countries, γ.λ accounts for more than half of 
the total effect (β). This illustrates education’s important role in the intergenera-
tional transmission of (dis)advantage. Indeed, in several countries, δ (the residual) 
is small and statistically insignificant, including Denmark, Finland, Norway, Swe-
den, Austria, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Hence, conditional upon 
educational achievement, parental education has little additional impact upon 
offspring’s earnings. In contrast, the residual effect of parental education (δ) is 
Figure 2. Income inequality and the link between family background and labor-market 
earnings
All PIAAC countries Transition economies excluded
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Note: Authors’ calculations using the PIAAC data set. Left-hand panel includes all countries 
with data available (Pearson correlation = 0.39; Spearman’s rank = 0.49). Right-hand panel 
excludes transition economies (Pearson correlation = 0.86; Spearman’s rank = 0.81). See 
appendix table A1 for country codes.
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substantial in France, Japan, South Korea, and the UK, where the low parental 
education group earns 20 percent less than the high parental education group, 
even when they hold the same level of qualification in the same subject area. 
To test the robustness of these results, we have re-estimated the decomposition 
using respondents’ standardized years of education (rather than qualification 
level). There was little change to the substantive results reported above.
Figure 3 considers whether offspring’s educational attainment may be driving 
our version of the GGC. The association between income inequality and γ.λ 
Table 2. Decomposition of the Intergenerational Association into the “Through Education” and 
“Residual” Effect of Parental Education on Offspring’s Labor-Market Earnings
Total (β) Through ed (γ*λ) Residual (δ)
β SE γ*λ SE δ SE
Russia 0.35 0.23 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.14
Slovak Republic 0.55 0.10 0.35 0.07 0.21 0.13
Japan 0.37 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.06
UK 0.42 0.07 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.07
Korea 0.33 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.05
USA 0.56 0.09 0.44 0.05 0.12 0.08
France 0.33 0.04 0.23 0.03 0.11 0.04
Estonia 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.06
Poland 0.47 0.10 0.38 0.05 0.10 0.10
Italy 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.18
Australia 0.25 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.05
Canada 0.22 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.04
Denmark 0.21 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.06
Sweden 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.04
Spain 0.30 0.13 0.27 0.03 0.04 0.14
Ireland 0.33 0.07 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.06
Finland 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.05
Austria 0.20 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.08
Netherlands 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.05
Czech Republic 0.26 0.06 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.08
Germany 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.04 –0.03 0.07
Belgium 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.02 –0.05 0.05
Norway 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.03 –0.05 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimates using the PIAAC data set. The left-hand columns provide the total 
earnings differential between individuals from advantaged (high parental education) and 
disadvantaged (low parental education) backgrounds. The right-hand columns provide the 
analogous earnings differential after the offspring’s own educational attainment has been 
controlled (the “residual” effect). The middle columns give the difference between the two 
(the “through education” effect).
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(the “through education” component of β) is presented in panel (a) with analo-
gous results for δ (the “residual” component) in panel (b).
There is a strong and statistically significant association in panel (a); the cor-
relation coefficient equals 0.70 (Spearman’s rank = 0.62), with a 0.10 increase 
in the Gini coefficient associated with a 0.13 increase in γ*λ. This is consistent 
with the theoretical model presented in figure  1; the link between income 
inequality and educational attainment is a key driver of our version of the 
GGC. Yet, there is also a reasonably strong association in panel (b) (Pearson 
correlation = 0.67, Spearman’s rank = 0.63, p = 0.01), with the residual effect 
(δ) increasing by 0.12 for each 0.10 increase in the Gini coefficient. Again, very 
similar findings held using respondents’ years of education rather than qualifi-
cation level.
Is the “Through Education” Component of the GGC Driven  
by Socio-Economic Inequality in Educational Attainment 
or the Returns to Education?
As noted above, the “through education” component comprises:
(i) The intergenerational correlation of educational attainment (λ)
(ii) The labor-market returns to qualifications (γ).
We now consider whether λ and γ are greater in more unequal countries.Table 3 
presents differences between low and high parental education groups in terms of 
Figure 3. A decomposition of the Great Gatsby Curve
Explained effect
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Note: The left-hand panel illustrates the relationship between income inequality and the explained 
effect of parental education on offspring income (i.e., the part that works through offspring’s 
education attainment). Pearson correlation equals 0.70. Right-hand panel illustrates the 
relationship between income inequality and the residual effect of parental education on offspring 
income (i.e., net of the offspring’s educational attainment). Pearson correlation equals 0.60.
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(i) obtaining a bachelor’s degree and (ii) standardized years of schooling. These 
are our measures of λ.
Differences by parental education in offspring’s educational attainment are 
large and significantly significant in all countries, though there is also substantial 
cross-national variation. Gaps are comparatively small in Scandinavia; individu-
als from low parental education backgrounds are 24 percentage points less likely 
to graduate from university than individuals from high parental education back-
grounds in Sweden, for example. On the other hand, there is a 50-percentage-
point difference in the probability of university graduation in the transition 
Table 3. Socio-Economic Differences in University Graduation Rates and Years of Schooling (λ)
University access Years of schooling
Percentage-point 
difference Standard error Effect size Standard error
Czech Republic 57.1 4.1 1.57 0.11
Slovak Republic 57.0 3.8 1.48 0.13
Poland 55.2 4.4 1.34 0.11
Italy 51.5 4.9 1.43 0.18
Russia 49.9 3.9 0.93 0.15
United States 46.0 2.5 1.24 0.08
Spain 45.6 3.5 1.02 0.06
Japan 44.1 3.4 1.02 0.07
France 43.0 2.8 0.98 0.07
United Kingdom 42.7 4.2 1.05 0.10
Norway 36.9 2.6 0.91 0.06
Korea 36.2 3.6 0.78 0.06
Netherlands 36.1 3.1 0.78 0.07
Australia 34.5 2.4 0.86 0.05
Germany 34.0 3.4 1.00 0.12
Estonia 33.9 2.2 0.85 0.07
Ireland 33.3 3.1 0.89 0.07
Belgium 32.7 2.6 0.99 0.06
Austria 29.4 2.7 0.99 0.09
Finland 28.8 3.4 0.81 0.08
Canada 28.3 2.2 0.80 0.05
Denmark 23.9 2.3 0.81 0.06
Sweden 23.7 2.5 0.66 0.06
Note: Authors’ calculations using the PIAAC data set. Left-hand columns provide the estimated 
percentage-point difference in holding a bachelor’s degree between individuals from high and 
low parental education backgrounds. The right-hand columns are the difference in years of 
schooling between individuals from high and low parental education backgrounds, expressed 
as an effect size (national standard-deviation differences).
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economies (the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia). Elsewhere, 
parental education differences in university graduation are comparatively large 
in Italy, Japan, and the United States (approximately 45-to-50-percentage-point 
gaps) relative to Austria and Canada (25-to-30-percentage-point gaps). In addi-
tional analysis, we explored the association between parental education and sub-
ject specialism, and found only a weak link in most countries.
Figure 4 plots these estimates of λ against income inequality, with university 
graduation results in panel (a) and standardized years of schooling in panel (b). 
A reasonably strong and statistically significant association is observed in both. 
The Pearson correlation equals 0.74 in panel (a) (Spearman’s rank = 0.74), where 
there is a 15-percentage-point increase in the difference between low and high 
parental education groups graduating from university for each 0.10 increase in 
the Gini coefficient. Although the correlation is weaker in panel (b) (Pearson = 
0.59, Spearman = 0.62, p = 0.01), a 0.10 increase in the Gini coefficient is still 
associated with a 0.28-standard-deviation increase in the low–high parental edu-
cation gap in years of schooling.
This provides indicative evidence that access to financial resources matters in 
the intergenerational transmission process. Disparities in financial resources by 
parental education group are greater in more unequal countries, translating into 
bigger differences in families’ ability to invest in their offspring’s education. 
Moreover, as discussed above, heredity transfers are unlikely to vary across coun-
tries, while nonfinancial resources are unlikely to be strongly associated with the 
level of income inequality in society (see appendix C for empirical evidence on 
this matter). Consequently, it is the financial resource component of parental 
Figure 4. Income inequality and the socio-economic gradient in educational attainment
University graduation Years of schooling (standardised)
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Note: The left-hand panel illustrates the relationship between income inequality and the high-
low parental education gap in holding a bachelor’s degree. Pearson correlation equals 0.74. The 
right-hand panel illustrates the relationship between income inequality and the estimated high-
low parental education gap in respondents’ years of education (standardized within country). 
Pearson correlation equals 0.59. See appendix table A1 for country codes.
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education that is the most credible explanation as to why λ is positively associ-
ated with income inequality. Further, as subject choice is only weakly associated 
with parental education in most countries (despite well-known differences in 
economic returns), differences in families’ capacity to invest (rather than the 
incentives) seem the more likely driving force.
Table 4 examines financial returns to education (γ). The left-hand side presents 
the earnings differential between university and high school graduates, while the 
Table 4. The Wage Returns to University Qualifications (γ) and Standardized Years of 
Schooling
University degree Years of schooling
γ SE
% difference 
[exp(γ)] γ SE
% difference 
[exp(γ)]
USA 0.73 0.07 107 0.34 0.03 41
Ireland 0.63 0.07 88 0.32 0.03 37
Germany 0.57 0.06 76 0.25 0.02 28
Poland 0.52 0.05 68 0.25 0.02 28
Slovak Republic 0.50 0.09 64 0.22 0.04 25
Belgium 0.48 0.04 62 0.19 0.02 21
UK 0.47 0.05 61 0.21 0.03 24
Spain 0.47 0.06 60 0.19 0.02 21
Korea 0.45 0.05 58 0.20 0.02 22
Canada 0.45 0.04 57 0.19 0.02 21
Austria 0.45 0.06 56 0.17 0.02 18
France 0.44 0.04 55 0.19 0.02 21
Australia 0.43 0.04 54 0.20 0.02 22
Czech Republic 0.41 0.07 51 0.16 0.03 18
Netherlands 0.41 0.07 51 0.20 0.03 22
Finland 0.39 0.03 47 0.16 0.02 17
Norway 0.38 0.05 47 0.20 0.03 22
Denmark 0.37 0.05 45 0.17 0.02 19
Russia 0.36 0.34 43 0.03 0.04 3
Japan 0.35 0.05 42 0.18 0.02 19
Estonia 0.35 0.05 41 0.15 0.02 17
Sweden 0.33 0.03 38 0.14 0.01 15
Italy 0.24 0.07 27 0.12 0.02 13
Note: Authors’ calculations using the PIAAC data set. “University degree” results refer to the 
difference in earnings between individuals holding a university degree relative to high school 
education or below. “Years of schooling” results refer to the wage return per each national 
standard-deviation increase in years of schooling. The left-hand-most figures refer to the 
estimated regression coefficients, while the right-hand column converts these into percentage 
differences. SE column provides the standard errors.
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right-hand side illustrates the change in respondents’ wages for each national 
standard-deviation increase in years of schooling.
Wage returns are particularly high in the United States, where university grad-
uates earn, on average, double the amount of high school graduates (γ = 0.73; 
exp(γ) = 1.07). Returns are also high in Canada, Belgium, Ireland, Germany, and 
the UK, where the graduate wage premium is approximately 60 percent or more. 
In contrast, there is just a 27 percent wage differential in Italy, 38 percent in Swe-
den, and 42 percent in Japan. The Scandinavian countries are all within the bot-
tom half of the table (comparatively low returns on tertiary education). A broadly 
similar pattern holds when considering returns on additional years of schooling, 
with high returns in the United States, Germany, and Ireland, and lower returns 
in Sweden, Finland, Italy, and Belgium.
Figure 5, panel A, illustrates the link between the returns on tertiary education 
and income inequality. Although there is an association (Pearson = 0.42, Spear-
man = 0.42, p = 0.10), a small number of countries have a big influence upon this 
result; the exclusion of Italy substantially increases the observed correlation 
(Pearson = 0.63), while the deletion of the United States dramatically reduces it 
(Pearson = 0.22). Indeed, the association actually turns negative with the removal 
of just three data points (Sweden, Ireland, and the United States). Figure 5, panel B, 
presents analogous results for the association between income inequality and the 
returns to additional years of schooling. There is a sign of a moderate correlation 
(Pearson = 0.49), which remains stable if Ireland, Italy, and the United States are 
Figure 5. Income inequality and the returns to education
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Note: Authors’ calculations using PIAAC data set. Left-hand panel presents the percentage 
difference in wages between individuals holding a bachelor’s degree versus those with only 
postsecondary education. Correlation coefficient = 0.42 (0.63 when Italy excluded and 0.22 
when United States excluded). Right-hand panel presents results for a one-standard-deviation 
increase in years of schooling. Correlation = 0.49 (0.51 with Italy, Ireland, and US excluded). See 
appendix table 1 for country codes.
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excluded as outliers (Pearson = 0.51). Nevertheless, the correlation between 
income inequality and wage returns (γ) seems to be slightly weaker than the 
 correlation between income inequality and the intergeneration correlation of 
education (λ).
The Link between Income Inequality and Educational Systems
We now examine the hypothesis that public expenditure on education is lower, 
and private investments made by families higher, in more unequal countries. Spe-
cifically, we estimate the association between income inequality and the following 
five factors:
•	 Expenditure on education as a percent of GDP
•	 Percent of pupils enrolled in private-independent schools
•	 Percent of pupils using a private out-of-school tutor
•	 Socio-economic differences in the probability of using a private out-of-school 
tutor
•	 Tertiary education tuition costs.
Unfortunately, historical information for most of the above is not available (or 
has not been collected in a comparable manner). Our empirical analysis therefore 
focuses upon how income inequality is linked to “present-day” (post-2000) dif-
ferences in these aspects of educational systems. Pearson and Spearman correla-
tions are presented in table 5.
More economically unequal countries tend to spend a lower proportion of 
national wealth on education (r = –0.50; p = 0.04). In contrast, they have a greater 
proportion of children attending a private school (r = 0.49; p = 0.06) or using 
out-of-school private tutors (r = 0.67; p < 0.01). Moreover, the socio-economic 
gap in use of private tutors is also related to income inequality (r = 0.59; p = 
0.02). Finally, there is a particularly prominent relationship between income 
inequality and university tuition fees (r = 0.73; p < 0.01). For instance, whereas 
average annual tuition fees are above $US 6,000 per annum (PPP adjusted) in 
high-income-inequality countries like Ireland, the United States, and Japan, they 
are below $2,000 per annum in lower income inequality countries like Austria, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark.12 These findings illustrate 
how income inequality is linked to public and private investments made in educa-
tion, and how public schooling systems have less scope to level the playing field 
between rich and poor when the income distribution is relatively dispersed.
Conclusions
Income inequality is high and rising in a number of developed countries. Both 
academics and policymakers fear that this may have negative implications for 
future rates of social mobility. Much of this concern stems from the Great Gatsby 
Curve, which illustrates how economically unequal countries also tend to be the 
least socially mobile. However, due to variation across countries in data quality 
and methods used, concerns have been raised regarding the robustness of the 
GGC relationship (Jäntti and Jenkins 2013). Moreover, if the GGC does exist, 
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what are the mechanisms underpinning it? Little is currently known about this 
important issue, including the potential role of educational attainment.
The original contribution of this paper is hence twofold. First, we have 
attempted to replicate the GGC using cross-nationally comparable data and an 
alternative definition of intergenerational mobility. Second, we have empirically 
investigated the potential mediating role of educational attainment in the rela-
tionship between income inequality and intergenerational mobility for the first 
time. Our results have pointed toward the following six key results:
(i) The GGC can be replicated using alternative measures of intergenerational 
mobility and cross-nationally comparable data. The strength of the associa-
tion depends, however, upon whether transition economies are included.
(ii) In all countries, it is educational attainment that is driving the link between 
parental education and offspring’s earnings.
(iii) There is a strong association between income inequality and both the 
explained and residual effect of parental education on offspring’s earnings.
(iv) Although income inequality is associated with both access to education and 
its financial returns, the strength of the relationship seems to be greater for 
the former than the latter. This suggests that the intergenerational correlation 
of education may be the more important driver of the link between income 
inequality and the “through education” component of β.
(v) The fact that the association between parental education, offspring’s educa-
tion, and offspring’s earnings varies by income inequality suggests that finan-
cial resources play an important role in the intergenerational transmission of 
advantage.
(vi) High-inequality countries have more private investment in education and less 
public investment. This further emphasizes the important role of financial 
resources in the transmission of advantage in countries with greater inequality.
Table 5. The Correlation between Income Inequality and Key Educational Inputs
Variable Source Year
# of 
countries
Pearson 
correlation
Spearman 
correlation
Education expenditure as a 
percent of GDP
UN 1975 18 –0.50** –0.58**
Percent of secondary school 
pupils enrolled in private school
PISA 
2009
2009 16 0.49* 0.70**
Percent of pupils who have 
received out-of-school tutoring
PISA 
2000
2000 16 0.67** 0.63**
Parental education differences 
in the percent of pupils receiving 
out-of-school tutoring
PISA 
2000
2000 16 0.59** 0.71**
University tuition costs EAG 
2013
2011 18 0.73** 0.77**
Note: Authors’ calculations. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent and 
5 percent level, respectively. EAG = Education at a Glance. UN = United Nations. PISA = 
Programme for International Student Assessment.
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These findings have important implications for both academic understanding 
of intergenerational mobility and contemporary public policy. While some have 
questioned the importance of financial resources in the intergenerational trans-
mission process (Mayer 1997), others believe this factor to be key (Becker 
1964). In this paper, we have argued that families with greater financial 
resources have (a) greater capacity to invest in their offspring’s development; 
and (b) greater incentive to invest when economic returns to education are high. 
Consequently, if financial resources are indeed an important driver of the inter-
generational transmission of advantage, a strong relationship should be 
observed between income inequality and the “through education” component 
of intergenerational mobility. Our analysis suggests that although both finan-
cial and nonfinancial resources are likely to be important in the intergenera-
tional transmission of advantage, the former is likely to be the dominant reason 
why income inequality is linked to mobility. This finding may arguably be 
driven more by differences between families’ capacity to invest in education 
rather than their incentives, given the relatively weak link between parental 
education and subject specialism observed in most countries. Thus, ensuring 
that families have adequate access to financial resources, potentially through 
condensing the income distribution, may be pivotal in ensuring that young 
people have equal opportunities to succeed.
These findings should, of course, be considered in light of the limitations of 
our study. First, we remind readers that it is only currently possible to examine 
associations between income inequality and intergenerational mobility, rather 
than producing causal estimates. Second, one cannot rule out the possibility 
that different findings would emerge if parental occupation were used to mea-
sure social origin and destination (rather than education and earnings), due to 
well-documented cross-national differences between earnings and social class 
mobility (Blanden 2013). Third, the number of countries with high-quality 
income inequality and intergenerational mobility data remains restricted. 
Indeed, our analysis is based upon the experiences of 23 countries (18 when 
transition economies are excluded), meaning that statistical power is limited. 
Finally, due to the above, it has only been possible to perform cross-sectional 
analyses. Yet, a longitudinal study, investigating whether change in income 
inequality across countries is associated with change in rates of social mobility, 
would provide stronger evidence as to whether there is indeed a causal relation-
ship between the two. However, although these are clearly important directions 
for future research, they will become possible only when new data are made 
available.
Thus, while we stress that our results refer to associations only, they never-
theless suggest that educational inequality is likely to be a key factor mediat-
ing the link between income inequality and intergenerational mobility. 
Likewise, our findings highlight how parental access to financial resources is 
likely to play a key role in the intergenerational transmission of social advan-
tage. Policies focused on the redistribution of financial resources, and on 
 minimizing educational disparities between rich and poor, are therefore likely 
to be vital in ensuring that the next generation has equal opportunities to 
 succeed.
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Notes
1. The β coefficients will occasionally be presented in percentage differences, calculated 
as {( ( ) ) }exp β
∧
− 1 100× .
2. While we acknowledge that parental education alone may not capture all domains of 
social origin, we are restricted by data availability. See Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2012) 
for a discussion of the relative merits of social class, status, and education as predic-
tors of educational attainment.
3. Appendix B illustrates how results for the United States and UK would change were 
parental income used.
4. Income inequality during childhood is clearly the most relevant time point to con-
sider family background differences in parental capacity to invest. However, income 
inequality during the offspring’s childhood may also be relevant for parental incen-
tives. For instance, parental perceptions of the returns to education will influence 
their decision of whether to invest in their children’s education (which will be influ-
enced by the income inequality they observe when their children are growing up). 
Consequently, the association between income inequality and parental capacity to 
invest, and between income inequality and parental incentives to invest, are con-
founded.
5. One possibility is that greater income inequality means greater returns to education, 
providing high-education families with greater incentive to make NF investments in 
their children.
6. We have re-estimated all models for women (see appendix I). The key conclusions 
reached continue to hold, though the observed Great Gatsby association (excluding 
transition countries) is slightly weaker than for men (correlation = 0.62). Moreover, 
the link between income inequality and the residual effect (δ) is weaker for women 
(correlation = 0.32) than for men (correlation = 0.67).
7. See http://www.lisdatacenter.org/.
8. Although imputed years of schooling is provided, our investigations suggest that a 
different approach has been taken in different countries. Thus, for cross-national 
comparability, we have preferred to create a new measure using a consistent method-
ology.
9. http://www.lisdatacenter.org/data-access/key-figures/inequality-and-poverty/.
10. http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html.
11. The childhood income inequality measure predates the LIS, and so is low quality and 
lacks cross-national comparability. This could attenuate the link between childhood 
income inequality and intergenerational associations (including λ). In contrast, mea-
sures of present-day inequality are of higher quality, and have a greater degree of 
international comparability (and thus are unlikely to be subject to the same down-
ward inconsistency).
12. Fewer cross-country data are available on post-schooling factors, including unpaid 
internships and parental support during job search. However, Bingley, Corak, and 
Westergård-Nielsen (2011) suggest that fathers and sons are more likely to have had 
the same employer in Canada (a moderate-income-inequality country) than Denmark 
(a low-inequality country).
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at Social Forces online, http://sf.oxfordjournals.
org/.
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